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Abstract
Financial market interdependence has been at the epicenter of the crisis in the
euro area. This paper tests for the existence of financial contagion during this crisis,
defined as the international transmission of country-specific shocks beyond the normal
channels of financial interdependence. Since contagion relates purely to country-
specific shocks, we combine the standard contagion test of Favero and Giavazzi (2002)
with an innovative narrative approach to separate out global and euro area shocks
from country-specific shocks. Financial contagion has been widespread during the
crisis in the euro area. About 80 percent of country-specific shocks are contagious.
We also find significant evidence of flight-to-safety effects between the core and the
periphery of the euro area. Global and euro area shocks have been important drivers
of sovereign bond yields in the euro area.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial market interde-
pendence has been at the epicenter of the global financial market mayhem. Much in the
same fashion as the famous butterfly effect, shocks occurring in a specific asset market in a
particular country seem to spread throughout the entire global financial system. The inter-
national transmission of country-specific shocks should not come as a surprise. The process
of globalization has led to a relatively high level of economic and financial interdependence
across countries. This being said, there is often a perception that the transmission of shocks
is different, in particular stronger, during episodes of financial crises. Accordingly, financial
contagion is said to exist when the transmission of unusually large country-specific shocks
goes beyond the normal degree of financial market interdependence.
In this paper, we test for contagion between sovereign bond markets in the euro area
during the financial crisis. Several countries which adopted the euro as a common currency
are currently suffering from heightened financial market volatility. Large shocks in some
countries are spreading through the whole area. Again, such a transmission of shocks
should be expected given the large degree of financial integration across the euro area
(Gonzalez-Paramo, 2011). This being said, anecdotal evidence suggests that the degree to
which country-specific shocks are spreading to other countries has changed since the onset
of the financial crisis. Accordingly, we test in a formal setting whether, since the onset
of the financial crisis, the transmission of shocks specific to individual euro area countries
differs from what the normal degree of financial market interdependence would imply.
We follow the approach put forward by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) to model financial
market interdependence and to test for the existence of financial contagion. This approach
addresses several pitfalls identified in other studies which are outlined in our review of the
literature.
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Our main contribution to the empirical literature on financial contagion is the use of
a narrative approach to separate out different sources of shocks. Financial markets are
rocked by a wide range of shocks. We distinguish between global shocks, euro area shocks,
and country-specific shocks. Global shocks typically affect all countries simultaneously,
in the same way but not necessarily to the same extent. From the perspective of the
euro area, the collapse of Lehman Brothers represented a global shock to their sovereign
bond markets as investors were fleeing to the safe haven of riskless sovereign bonds. Euro
area shocks affect several euro area economies simultaneously, but not necessarily in the
same way. The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility in May 2010 led
to a sharp decrease in sovereign bond yields in the periphery of the euro area, but an
increase in the sovereign bond yields of Germany and the Netherlands. Country-specific
shocks are, by definition, idiosyncratic to the country under consideration. A proper test
of contagion, focusing on the transmission of unusually large country-specific shocks across
borders, requires a proper identification of country-specific shocks to start with. Failing to
separate out global shocks and euro area shocks from country-specific shocks may lead us to
conclude, incorrectly, that contagion occurs when two national bond markets are actually
affected by a common shock. The identification of different types of shocks relies on the
historical record of financial news from Reuters. This identification procedure is interesting
in and of itself as it provides significant qualitative information about the unfolding of the
crisis.
We focus on the sovereign bond markets of nine euro area countries, namely Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The sample
period extends from January 2007 to July 2012. Our results shows that financial con-
tagion across sovereign bond markets in the euro area has been widespread during the
crisis. About 80 percent of country-specific shocks are contagious. Interestingly, about
one third of these contagious country-specific shocks induce opposite effects on some other
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countries in the sample. This evidence points to flight-to-safety effects, whereby a shock in
a country induces an opposite movement in the bond yields of some other countries. From
a methodological point of view, this finding illustrates the need to identify each country-
specific shock individually, instead of relying on sub-samples of the data and assuming that
contagion necessarily entails stronger interdependence. The set of possible effects is quite
large. The combination of the statistical approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and our
narrative approach allows us to consider the full set of possible effects, thus improving on
the existing literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing
literature. Section 3 describes the empirical approach put forward by Favero and Giavazzi
(2002) and explains how the narrative approach helps identifying different sources of shocks.
Section 4 deals with data. Section 5 presents our estimation results in two steps, in line
with the approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002), and provides for further interpretation.
Section 6 summarizes the main messages of our paper and outlines some avenues for future
research.
2 Literature review
A large literature on financial contagion developed in the aftermath of financial crises in
advanced economies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in emerging market economies
during the 1990s. A lot of attention was devoted to define contagion. Several early con-
tributions modeled contagion as a process through which shocks in one country would
be transmitted to other countries. For example, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)
explored the impact of a currency crisis in one country on the probability that another
country may also experience a currency crisis. Such an approach comes close to the epi-
demiological literature where the probability that someone catches a given disease is a
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probability function of someone else’s having this disease, other things equal. Further-
more, one may study which country characteristics make it more vulnerable to infection
from a currency crisis elsewhere.
Later contributions have refined the definition of contagion (see, for example, Forbes
and Rigobon, 2002). The process of globalization has led to a sharp rise in real and financial
interdependence across countries. Thus, it should be no surprise that shocks in one country
spread to other countries. Trade and financial linkages have been identified as two major
avenues for the transmission of country-specific shocks (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001;
Forbes, 2002). But there has often been a perception that the strength of the transmission
of shocks is different during crises. This is a different question. Are country-specific shocks
transmitted across countries differently during financial crises? In this context, contagion
has been defined as the international transmission of country-specific shocks beyond the
normal channels of financial market interdependence.1 This is the definition which we
adopt in this paper.
The emerging literature on the crisis in the euro area can be divided along the lines
of the early and late definitions of contagion. Several papers focus on the transmission of
changes in bond yields or CDS spreads across euro area economies. Arezki, Candelon and
Sy (2011) and Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012) assess the extent to which sovereign credit
rating changes in a given country affect bond yields and CDS spreads in other countries.
Similarly, De Santis (2012) examines how rating downgrades for Greece have affected other
euro area countries. These three studies bear a large resemblance with the pioneering work
of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) for currency crises. Mink and De Haan (2012)
use an event study approach to assess the impact of Greek rating downgrades on the stock
returns of 48 commercial banks in Europe. Finally, Caceres, Guzzo and Segoviano (2010)
construct a spillover coefficient for ten euro area countries and find that distress in one
1See Dungey et al. (2005) for an exhaustive review of methodologies to test for contagion.
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country raises the probability of a credit event in other countries. As such, these studies
cast light on the transmission of country-specific shocks across countries, but they do not
test whether the strength of this transmission differs when unusually large shocks occur.
A range of other papers have focused on the later definition of contagion, testing whether
sovereign bond yields or CDS spreads in some countries are affected differently when a
country experiences an unusually large shock. Some of these contributions are inspired
by the correlation approach to testing for contagion.2 Missio and Watzka (2011) compute
dynamic pairwise correlations between seven euro area economies, assuming that the crisis
originates in Greece. Similarly, Fong and Wong (2012) make use of CoVaR, a measure of
the value-at-risk associated with one country conditional on the value-at-risk associated
with another country in crisis. Gomez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2011) use rolling Granger-
causality regressions for pairs of euro area countries to assess the directionality of changes
in bond yields across euro area countries. Zhang, Schwaab and Lucas (2011) examine the
marked-implied probability of default of individual euro area countries, conditional on a
credit even in Greece. In this context, they also compute dynamic pairwise correlation
coefficients to assess time variation in these coefficients.
All these contributions, even though they cast light on the stability of the transmission
of country-specific shocks, share a common pitfall: they allow only for a pairwise analysis of
contagion. Hence, the underlying methodologies prevent a more encompassing assessment
of contagion across several countries within a single model. More importantly, as forcefully
argued by Dungey et al. (2005) among others, in order to test whether country-specific
shocks are transmitted across countries beyond the normal degree of interdependence, we
2Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that the correlation coefficient
during a crisis period may change purely because volatility increases during that period, and not because
the degree of financial market interdependence has changed. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) propose an
adjustment to the correlation coefficient estimated over the crisis period. However, this adjustment is only
valid under the assumption that the financial market variable in the country where the shock originates
is exogenous. This assumption is unlikely to be satisfied in the case of highly interdependent financial
markets.
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should model the normal degree of interdependence to start with.
Another common pitfall in some but not all of these studies is the failure to control
for common shocks. Correlation in the data would equally result from a country-specific
shock being transmitted across countries, or a common shock affecting both countries
simultaneously. To the extent that contagion refers solely to the international transmission
of country-specific shocks, we should control carefully for common shocks.
These two pitfalls - only pairwise comparisons, no common shocks - are addressed
by Metiu (2012) and Caporin et al. (2012). Metiu (2012) extends the contagion model
of Pesaran and Pick (2007). This model features simultaneous equations, one for each
country, and includes common shocks. Importantly, the source of these common shocks is
assumed (typically some high-frequency financial variable of global relevance such as the
VSTOXX index). Moreover, shocks are assumed to come only from the periphery of the
euro area (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Thus, potential important shocks
from core euro area economies are assumed away. Finally, Metiu (2012) only considers the
time period between January 2008 and February 2012. Thus, the whole sample period is
largely a crisis period.
Caporin et al. (2012) is the closest contribution to our paper. Again, part of the analy-
sis relies on a model of simultaneous equations. In this model, contagion is tested using the
limited-information approach put forward by Rigobon (2003). Again, common shocks are
assumed to operate through a small number of global financial variables. This assumption
is again questionable as there have been several shocks arising from the political process
around the resolution of the crisis. Some political shocks have been very important for the
dynamics of sovereign bond spreads, and it is unclear to what extent global financial vari-
ables measure them adequately. Moreover, the sample period between November 2008 and
September 2011 overlaps almost entirely with the crisis period, as the authors acknowledge
themselves. Thus, their finding of no contagion, only interdependence could well arise from
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the fact that their analysis tests for contagion within a crisis sample, and does not compare
a crisis sub-sample to a normal sub-sample.3 Finally, the test of Rigobon (2003) does not
allow to test for different types of contagion, not least flight-to-safety effects. Sometimes,
during crises, a negative shock in one country induces a negative effect in another country,
but a positive one in a third, safe-haven country. Such effects are important to analyze to
better understand patterns of contagion.
Hence, we follow closely the approach put forward by Favero and Giavazzi (2002).
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) construct a full model of simultaneous equations, one for each
country. The reduced-form model is estimated to identify episodes of unusually large
movements in sovereign bond yields. This set of unusually large movements defines the
crisis sub-sample in our data.4 We then use our narrative approach to separate out global
shocks, euro area shocks and country-specific shocks, in order to have a proper test for
contagion. Again, failing to control for common shocks, we may wrongly conclude that a
country-specific shock is spreading to another country beyond the normal degree of financial
market interdependence, when in fact both countries are hit by a common shock. Moreover,
our narrative approach is flexible in the sense that we do not have to assume the source
of common shocks to start with. The historical record of news will tell us what are the
relevant common shocks. Finally, since this approach identifies each individual country-
specific shock, we can test for different patterns of contagion, especially flight-to-safety
effects. We now explain the empirical approach in more details.
3In fact, Caporin et al. (2012) find some evidence of statistical significance of contagion, but conclude
in favor of no contagion on the basis of economic significance.
4Many other contagion methodologies require the definition of a crisis sub-sample (window) ex ante.
The Rigobon (2003) test as well as the contribution of Bekaert et al. (2011) are two examples.
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3 Empirical approach
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) develop a dynamic structural system of simultaneous equations
to model financial market interdependence. For the sake of the exposition, we will focus on
a two-country setup and exclude lags and common shocks. Of course, these assumptions
will be relaxed once we implement the empirical approach.5
When there is no crisis, the model may simply be written as
s1,t = β12s2,t + ε1,t (1)
s2,t = β21s1,t + ε2,t
where si,t denotes sovereign bond yields for country i = 1, 2 at time t, the β coefficients
captures the normal degree of interdependence, and εi,t is an unobservable country-specific
shock for country i = 1, 2.
The reduced-form model is given by
s1,t =
1
β12β21
(ε1,t + β12ε2,t) (2)
s2,t =
1
β12β21
(β21ε1,t + ε2,t)
Thus, the sovereign bond yield in country 1 is affected by its own shocks, captured
by ε1,t, and also by shocks in country 2, captured by ε2,t, transmitted according to the
normal degree of interdependence, as measured by β12. Similarly, the sovereign bond yield
in country 2 is affected by its own shocks, captures by ε2,t, and also by shocks in country
5We refer the reader to Favero and Giavazzi (2002) for an exhaustive presentation of their approach.
Since we follow that approach closely, we only sketch the main steps within a simplified setup here.
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1, captured by ε1,t, transmitted according to the normal degree of interdependence, as
measured by β21.
Suppose now that the data generating process produces a number of unusually large
shocks to sovereign bond yields. This set of unusually large shocks defines the crisis sub-
sample. Again, contagion is defined as the transmission of a country-specific shock to
another country, having controlled for the normal degree of interdependence. Favero and
Giavazzi (2002) thus propose to augment the system of simultaneous equations with dummy
variables which capture the effects of such large country-specific shocks. In this case, the
system becomes
s1,t = β12s2,t + a11d1,t + a12d2,t + ε1,t (3)
s2,t = β21s1,t + a21d1,t + a22d2,t + ε2,t
where di,t is a dummy variable taking a value of one when an unusually large shock has
occurred in country i = 1, 2 at time t, and zero otherwise. Given the definition of contagion
outlined above, the null hypothesis of no contagion is specified as H0 : aij = 0, ∀ i 6= j.
Thus, having controlled for the normal degree of financial market interdependence through
the β coefficients, the aij, i 6= j coefficients will indicate whether an unusually large shock
has been transmitted to other countries beyond the normal degree of interdependence.
In practice, however, we observe only sovereign bond yields, that is si,t, i = 1, 2. Favero
and Giavazzi (2002) therefore start with an estimation of the reduced-form model of interde-
pendence as in Equation (2). Since the data generating process produces some unusually
large country-specific shocks, the residuals of the reduced-form model will feature some
unusually large values. Such large values would be picked up by the dummy variables.
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) create dummy variables taking a value of one on days where
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country-specific residuals exceed three times their standard deviation.
But an unusually large residual value may occur for several reasons. Take the example of
country 1. First, there may have been an unusually large shock in this country, which shows
up as a large residual. Second, there may have been an unusually large shock in country
2, which gets transmitted to country 1, either according to the normal degree of financial
market interdependence, or beyond the normal degree of financial market interdependence.
Finally, and importantly, a large residual may obtain when both countries are hit by
a common shock, either of a truly global nature (for example, the collapse of Lehman
Brothers) or of a more regional nature (for example, the creation of the EFSF in May
2010). Without further information on the underlying shocks, we cannot properly test for
contagion. We may wrongly conclude that an unusually large shock in country 1 has been
transmitted to country 2 beyond the normal degree of interdependence, when these two
countries have in fact been hit by an unusually large common shock.
A narrative approach provides a convenient to separate out global shocks, euro area
shocks and country-specific shocks. More precisely, once unusually large values have been
identified from the reduced-form residuals, we look at the historical record of news from
Reuters to determine whether the large residual represents a country-specific shock (and in
this case, in which country this shock occurs), a regional euro area shock, or a truly global
shock. The combination of a statistical approach and a narrative approach brings at least
three important benefits. First, as argued above, separating global and regional shocks
from country-specific shocks is crucial for a proper test of contagion. Second, the historical
record of news points to several different types of shocks, be it economic news, political
events, ratings changes, etc. Several papers have assumed a specific source of shocks ex
ante, often ratings changes, but there are potentially many more kinds of disturbances
which may be transmitted beyond the normal degree of interdependence. The narrative
approach does not make a priori assumptions about the source of shocks. Third, the source
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of shocks itself may evolve over time. It may be that global shocks are more important at
the onset of the crisis, while euro area and country-specific shocks become more prevalent
as the crisis unfolds. The narrative approach provides for a flexible way to identify the
relative importance of different sources of shocks over time.
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) include lags of the dependent variables to account for dy-
namics. The introduction of lags is also useful to obtain identification. As Equation (3)
makes clear, the structural model of interdependence is not identified. Favero and Giavazzi
(2002) restrict the lag structure in order to obtain identification. In effect, this restriction
allows for the maximum amount of interdependence while constraining the shape of the
dynamic response of each bond yield to structural shocks. Dungey et al. (2005) have
cautioned against this identification strategy on the ground of weak instruments. Weak
instruments are likely to be an issue mostly for equity market returns, for which persis-
tency is rather small, but not so much for bond yields (the focus of our paper), for which
persistence is substantial. In the end, allowing for the maximum amount of interdepen-
dence is essential in order to avoid to avoid labeling contagion what is actually normal
interdependence. Thus, we will follow Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and restrict the lag
structure.
To sum up, we estimate the reduced-form system, which turns out to be a vector-
autoregressive model, and look at residuals. Unusually large values of residuals are used to
construct a set of dummy variables which define the crisis sub-sample. Global, euro area
and country-specific shocks are distinguished using a narrative approach. The resulting
set of dummy variables is then included in the structural model of interdependence, which
is identified through restrictions on the lag structure and estimated by three-stage least
squares. The null hypothesis of no contagion can then be tested.
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4 Data
We focus on the sovereign bond markets of nine euro area countries, namely Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The sample
period ranges from January 2007 to early July 2012. Daily data are retrieved from Datas-
tream. Sovereign bond yields are benchmark ten-year government bond yields. Bond yields
are denominated in euros. Because of the common currency denomination, we do not face
the problem that yields may move purely because of exchange rate changes.
Studies of sovereign bond market contagion within the euro area have focused on both
bond yields and CDS spreads. In this paper, we have chosen to focus on bond yields but not
CDS spreads. Bilal and Singh (2012) have shown that there have been policy actions which
have moved bond yields substantially but not affected CDS spreads. The example of the
Securities Markets Programme of the ECB illustrates this decoupling between bond yields
and CDS spreads. Since policy actions with major effects on bond yields may represent an
unusually large shock in our analysis, we have therefore chosen to focus only on sovereign
bond yields.
The narrative approach helps us addressing the issue of non-overlapping trading hours
across international financial markets. For example, a major shock in the United States
may occur when European financial markets have already closed, such that there is no
contemporaneous interdependence. Of course, European markets will react when opening
on the following day. But a model of financial markets focusing on contemporaneous
interdependence will probably miss the transmission of this shock from the United States.
Some scholars have used two-day moving averages or even average weekly data in order
to solve this problem. Yet, this remedy is clearly suboptimal as averaging amounts to
smoothing the time series variation of financial market variables, thereby possibly missing
some extreme observations which are the key focus of our analysis. In contrast, our focus
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on the historical record of news allows us to track precisely at which time of the day a
specific piece of news was released. In turn, we can match precisely news with movements
in financial market variables.
5 Results
The empirical approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002) starts with the estimation of the
reduced-form model and the identification of country-specific shocks, and then proceeds
with the estimation of the structural model and the test of contagion. We follow the same
sequence for the presentation of our results.
5.1 Reduced-form model
We estimate the reduced-form VAR model assuming a maximum length of five lags and use
the usual information criteria to assess the optimal lag length. The likelihood ratio test,
the final prediction error (FPE) and the Akaike criterion (AIC) point to five lags, while
the Schwarz criterion and the Hannan-Quinn criterion point to two lags. This different
result is not surprising given the different emphasis that these criteria put on parsimony
against goodness of fit. If we increase the maximum lag length to twenty or even fifty
lags, the likelihood ratio test, FPE and AIC all point to twenty or fifty lags, while the
Schwarz criterion and the Hannan-Quinn criterion still point to two lags. Given the large
amount of coefficients to be estimated for the structural model of interdependence, we
favor parsimony against goodness of fit and select two lags. This being said, goodness
of fit remains very good as all adjusted R-squared statistics remain above 0.98. The
estimated coefficients show large persistence in sovereign bond yields, leading support to
our identification through lag restrictions.
The residuals obtained from the reduced-form VAR model feature a number of values
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Figure 2: Cumulative number of shocks
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above three times their standard deviation. These extreme residuals indicate days of
unusually large shocks to sovereign bond yields. Figure 1 displays these residuals for each
country in our sample. As expected, we do not obtain any unusually large shock before
September 2008. Even though there were some tensions in specific segments of financial
markets already in 2007, sovereign bond markets in the euro area remained unaffected until
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Then, a sequence of global shocks
rocked financial markets worldwide, leading investors to buy sovereign bonds from many
euro area countries. At the time, these sovereign bonds appeared largely riskless and were
used as a safe haven.
The beginning of the crisis in the euro area in the first half of 2010 was marked by
a significant divergence in sovereign bond yields within the euro area. Figure A1 in the
Appendix depicts this divergence. Sovereign bond yields of so-called periphery countries
increased substantially, notably in Greece, later followed by Ireland and Portugal. By the
summer of 2011, the crisis intensified and the sovereign bond yields of Italy and Spain
started to diverge too. As of today, the crisis continues despite several policy responses
aimed at preventing financial market fragmentation within the euro area. Figure 2 shows
the cumulative number of shocks, regardless of their type, over the sample period. Since
the summer of 2011, the number of shocks has increased continuously. Importantly, these
shocks represent both unusually large positive and negative shocks to sovereign bond yields.
Tables in the Appendix shows, for each day in which at least one country displays an
extreme residual, in which country such extreme residuals were found. Red arrows stand
for negative news in the sense that sovereign bond yields go up in an unusual manner,
while green arrows display positive news as yields go down in an unusual manner. On
this basis, the historical record of news from Reuters is used to distinguish between global
shocks, euro area shocks and country-specific shocks. We found 10 global shocks, 38 euro
area shocks, and 61 country-specific shocks. Global shocks occur largely in the second half
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of 2008, coinciding with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Euro area and country-specific
shocks occur mostly from April 2010 until the end of the sample period. Euro area shocks
are especially prevalent around EU Summits of heads of state or government. Of course,
the information in this table does not present a full chronology of the crisis as we looked
for news only on days when extreme residuals occurred.
5.2 Structural model and test for contagion
Once dummy variables have been constructed for global shocks, euro area shocks and
country-specific shocks, we include them in the structural model of interdependence. As
the structural model of interdependence is a system of simultaneous equations, testing for
contagion simply amounts to testing whether a dummy variable picking up a shock specific
to a given country is also significant in the equations for other countries.
The structural model is identified through restrictions on the lag structure. More
specifically, for each country we include only its own dynamics and exclude lags of other
countries. This assumption is broadly supported by the estimation output of the reduced-
form model. In the latter model, the sum of the two own lags is always close to but below
unity, while the sum of the two lags of other countries always lays around zero. Thus,
as emphasized by Dungey et al. (2005), sovereign bond yields exhibit strong persistence,
thereby making use of lag restrictions to obtain identification a valid strategy.
Estimation results for the structural model display little evidence of contemporaneous
financial market interdependence in normal times.6 This finding is consistent with a large
body of empirical evidence showing that sovereign bond market interdependence in the
euro area in normal times is almost fully driven by regional and global factors (European
Central Bank, 2012).
6These results are not presented here but are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1: Evidence on contagion
Date Shock BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT
19/09/2008 Global 0.137 0.138 0.169 0.129 0.139 0.118
29/09/2008 Global -0.129 -0.195 -0.140
06/10/2008 Global -0.154 -0.162 -0.175 -0.175 -0.151 -0.151 -0.150
22/10/2008 Global -0.093 -0.107 -0.150 -0.128
31/10/2008 Global 0.159 0.179 0.157 0.181 0.203 0.173 0.176
08/12/2008 Global 0.142 0.160 0.138 0.138 0.162 0.147
17/12/2008 Global -0.167 -0.165 -0.173 -0.176 -0.142 -0.155 -0.157 -0.166
26/02/2009 Global 0.126 0.144 0.138 0.139 0.140 0.122 0.160
19/03/2009 Global -0.169 -0.173 -0.181 -0.150 -0.140 -0.157 -0.136 -0.173
01/04/2009 Local 0.156 0.245
07/05/2009 Euro 0.085 0.132 0.125 0.125
01/03/2010 Local 0.190 0.129
29/04/2010 Euro -0.819 -0.409
10/05/2010 Euro -0.085 0.100 0.186 0.086 -1.050 -0.444 -4.381 -0.330 -1.521
10/11/2010 Local 0.654 0.224
12/11/2010 Euro -0.640 -0.401
01/12/2010 Euro 0.083 0.107 0.090 -0.263 -0.232 -0.166 -0.232
02/12/2010 Euro -0.430 -0.123 -0.106 -0.589
18/01/2010 Local 0.320
21/04/2011 Euro 0.296 0.175
03/05/2011 Euro -0.282 -0.512 0.591
04/05/2011 Local -0.877
20/06/2011 Euro 0.390
06/07/2011 Local 0.782 1.658
07/07/2011 Euro 0.407
11/07/2011 Euro 0.085 -0.101 -0.131 0.574 0.221 0.350 0.510
12/07/2011 Euro -0.338 -0.136 -0.607
13/07/2011 Euro 0.085 0.729 -0.107 0.174
18/07/2011 Euro 0.367 0.202 0.479 0.171
19/07/2011 Euro -0.506 -0.227 -0.270 -0.366
20/07/2011 Euro -0.446 -0.474 -0.138 -0.344
21/07/2011 Euro 0.082 0.086 -0.477 -0.159 -1.108 -0.261 -0.324
22/07/2011 Local -0.203 -1.603
25/07/2011 Euro 0.222 0.210 -0.305
27/07/2011 Euro -0.080 -0.090 -0.336 0.105
08/08/2011 Euro -0.177 -0.087 -0.850 -0.790
09/08/2011 Euro -0.439 -0.248
10/08/2011 Local -0.095 -0.149 -0.086 -0.133 0.279
30/08/2011 Local -0.174 -0.497
05/09/2011 Global -0.106 -0.150 0.129 0.540 0.255 0.364
13/09/2011 Local 3.644 0.114
15/09/2011 Euro -0.100 -1.818
16/09/1011 Local -0.196 -0.083 -0.105 -0.120 -1.906 -0.103
Continued on next page
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Date Shock BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT
04/10/2011 Local 0.145 0.251
11/10/2011 Local 0.579
14/10/2011 Local 0.106 0.094 0.156 0.287
01/11/2011 Local -0.212 -0.245 -0.126 0.143 1.943
03/11/2011 Local 2.259
07/11/2011 Local 0.855 0.295
09/11/2011 Local 0.103 0.092 0.179 -0.633 0.519
10/11/2011 Local 0.091 0.219 1.049 -0.351
11/11/2011 Local -0.365
14/11/2011 Local 0.086 0.172 0.273
15/11/2011 Euro 0.303 0.244 0.196 0.255 0.543 0.402
18/11/2011 Euro 0.094 -0.160 -0.132 -0.127
22/11/2011 Local 0.290 0.166
23/11/2011 Local 0.342 0.120 0.426 0.641 0.190
24/11/2011 Local 0.275 0.653 0.160 0.411
25/11/2011 Local 0.145 0.244 0.209 0.834
28/11/2011 Local -0.154 -0.096 -0.209 -0.118 0.854 0.437
30/11/2011 Euro -0.219 -0.145 -0.106 -0.149
01/12/2011 Euro -0.206 -0.253 -0.387 -0.373 0.273
05/12/2011 Euro -0.214 -0.096 -0.429 0.910 -0.745 -0.460
07/12/2011 Euro 0.117 -0.094 -0.160 0.213 0.965 0.128
08/12/2011 Euro 0.199 0.113 0.239 1.153 0.411
12/12/2011 Local -0.086 1.619 0.164
13/12/2011 Local -0.107 -1.191 0.105
14/12/2011 Euro -0.112 -0.083 0.279 -0.610 0.122
15/12/2011 Local -0.108 -0.194 -0.725 -0.125
16/12/2011 Local -0.157 -0.229 -1.244
06/01/2012 Local -1.034
10/01/2012 Local -0.092 1.237 -0.282
12/01/2012 Local -0.221 -0.129 -0.138 -0.865 -0.342
13/01/2012 Local 0.126 -0.512 -0.238
16/01/2012 Local 0.567 1.391
26/01/2012 Euro -0.122 -0.221 -0.184 0.795
27/01/2012 Local -0.120 -0.230 -0.154 -0.617
30/01/2012 Local 0.202 1.483
31/01/2012 Local -1.534 -0.166 -0.357
01/02/2012 Euro / -0.090 -0.158 1.343 -0.271 -0.699
Local
03/02/2012 Local 0.096 -0.769
10/02/2012 Euro 0.133 -0.565
13/02/2012 Local -0.506
15/02/2012 Local 1.173 0.163
29/02/2012 Local -0.379 -0.154 0.478
01/03/2012 Local -0.103 -0.105 -1.289 -0.211
06/03/2012 Local 0.112 -2.476 0.140
Continued on next page
20
Date Shock BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT
07/03/2012 Local 6.783
08/03/2012 Local 1.615 -0.122
09/03/2012 Local -2.811
12/03/2012 Local -27.736
14/03/2012 Local 0.100 0.123 -1.084
23/03/2012 Local -0.128 1.478
27/03/2012 Local -0.708 -0.595
02/04/2012 Euro 0.143 0.119 0.102 0.160
07/05/2012 Local -0.220 1.569 0.191
08/05/2012 Euro 0.306 0.508
09/05/2012 Local 0.117 0.243 0.161
14/05/2012 Local 0.222 2.898 0.201
15/05/2012 Local 0.299 1.518 0.151 0.223
24/05/2012 Local -0.137 -0.172 -0.103
31/05/2012 Local -0.126 -0.152 -0.144
11/06/2012 Euro 0.184 0.223 -0.379
12/06/2012 Local 0.115 0.104 0.084 0.130 0.289 0.482 0.170 0.176
14/06/2012 Local 0.208 -0.461
18/06/2012 Local 0.271 -1.300 0.108
22/06/2012 Local 0.446 -0.453
29/06/2012 Euro 0.102 -0.703 -0.445 -0.375 -0.161
05/07/2012 Euro 0.372 0.213 0.213
Note: Bold coefficients in red color highlight contagion episodes. Thus, as far as country-specific shocks
are concerned, these coefficients indicate dummy variables for a given country which were also significant
in the equations of some other countries. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. Blank
cells correspond to coefficients which were not statistically significant and are thus not reported.
Financial contagion across sovereign bond markets in the euro area has been widespread
during the crisis. Table 1 displays the estimation results. Most of the dummy variables
capturing shocks specific to a given country are also significant in the equations of some
other countries.7 Out of the 61 country-specific shocks in our sample, 50 of these have been
transmitted to at least one other country beyond the normal channels of interdependence.
Therefore, about 80 percent of country-specific shocks are contagious. To take just one
example, Bankia, a troubled Spanish bank, announced its partial nationalization on 9 May
2012, in a move to clean up its balance sheet plagued by toxic real estate assets. To the
extent that public capital injections weigh on public finances, the Spanish government bond
7If there would be no contagion at all over the whole sample period, then there would be no red-color
coefficient in Table 1.
21
yield increased significantly on that day. Moreover, this shock also affected the sovereign
bond yields of Belgium and Italy on that day, even after controlling for the normal degree
of financial market interdependence.
Interestingly, negative shocks do not always induce negative effects for other countries.
Conversely, positive shocks do not always induce positive effects for other countries. This
finding is important from a methodological point of view. As we emphasized above, the
presence of asymmetric contagious effects points to the need for identifying each specific
shock individually, rather than relying on sub-samples of the data and assuming that con-
tagion necessarily entails stronger interdependence. Out of the 50 country-specific shocks
which are contagious, 18 of these have been transmitted to another country with the op-
posite sign. Thus, about one third of the contagious shocks have an opposite impact on
some other country in the sample. For example, on 1 November 2011, Greek Prime Min-
ister Papandreou called for a shock referendum on the second bailout package for Greece.
This call largely increased uncertainty about the commitment of the Greek authorities to
implement the reforms attached to the bailout package. As a result, Greek sovereign bond
yields rose massively (almost two percentage points on that day). But this referendum call
also led to a significant rise in the Irish sovereign bond yield, and a significant fall in the
sovereign bond yields of France, Germany and the Netherlands. This asymmetric conta-
gious effect points to a flight-to-safety phenomenon, whereby investors sell riskier bonds
and buy bonds which are perceived as being free from default risk.
Euro area shocks typically affect several countries in the euro area, but not necessarily
in the same way. Out of the 38 euro area shocks, 21 of these lead to a similar (same
sign) impact on countries in our sample. The impact of the remaining 17 euro area shocks
does not take the same sign across all countries. Thus, the impact of euro area shocks
differs across countries in almost half of the cases. Again, this finding is important from
a methodological point of view and highlights the desirability of our narrative approach
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to identify different types of shocks. For example, the creation of the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) on 10 May 2010, along with the announcement by the European
Central Bank that it would purchase sovereign bonds through its Securities Markets Pro-
gramme, led to a substantial fall in the sovereign bond yields of Ireland, Spain, Greece,
Italy and Portugal, but to increases in the sovereign bond yields of France, Germany and
the Netherlands. The different reaction across countries to this shock is not surprising.
In this case, the creation of the EFSF essentially amounted to the abandonment of the
no-bailout clause of the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, from that point onwards, the core Eu-
ropean countries would agree to provide financial help to the periphery, such that fiscal
developments in the latter would now impede on the former.
Finally, global shocks usually affect many countries at the same time and in the same
way, but not necessarily to the same extent. This finding is reassuring as it lends support
to our identification strategy based on the historical record of financial news. For example,
on 6 October 2008, global equity prices plunged and led investors to flee to the safe haven
(at least at the time) of sovereign bonds of euro area countries. On that day, this global
shock thus led to a significant, synchronous fall in the sovereign bond yields of Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and Italy.
6 Concluding remarks
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the transmission of country-specific shocks across the
sovereign bond markets of euro area countries has changed since the onset of the crisis.
This paper tests for the existence of sovereign bond market contagion within a formal
setup with the help of the empirical approach put forward by Favero and Giavazzi (2002).
We supplement this approach with a narrative approach to separate out global shocks,
euro area shocks, and country-specific shocks. Since financial contagion relates purely to
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the transmission of country-specific shocks, it is necessary to identify global and euro area
shocks from country-specific shocks. Otherwise, we may wrongly conclude that financial
contagion exists when, in fact, two countries are affected by a common shock.
Financial contagion has been widespread during the crisis in the euro area. About 80
percent of country-specific shocks are contagious, in the sense that they transmit across
countries beyond what the normal channels of interdependence would imply. We uncover
significant evidence of flight-to-safety effects between the core and the periphery of the euro
area. About one third of contagious country-specific shocks induce an opposite impact on
some other country in the sample.
The combination of a statistical approach and a narrative approach to test for contagion
allows us to conclude that financial contagion has been strong during the crisis in the
euro area. Moreover, euro area shocks, mostly linked to policy responses to the crisis
announced by euro area policymakers, have exerted a strong effect on sovereign bond
spreads. However, our analysis does not allow us to draw conclusions about the ultimate
success or failure of these policy responses.8 The statistical approach identifies days during
which sovereign bond markets exhibit unusually large movements. The test for contagion
focuses squarely on those particular days. Yet, there are likely other days when important
policy announcements were made and sovereign bond yields did not move in an unusually
large manner. A fully encompassing analysis of the impact of all euro area policy responses
on sovereign bond yields would require a systematic event study analysis, considering
all days during which policy announcements were made, and not only those days when
sovereign bond yields moved in an unusual manner.
Two avenues for further research deserve mention. First, the narrative approach could
be pushed further to distinguish between various kinds of country-specific shocks, be it
economic news, political news, rating changes, etc. In this way, the hypothesis that different
8Forbes (2012) provides a qualitative evaluation of various policy responses aimed at mitigating conta-
gion.
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kinds of country-specific shocks have different contagious effects could be tested. Second,
in this paper, we have only considered a specific asset, namely a ten-year sovereign bond
yield, for a range of countries. Financial contagion could also be tested not only across
different countries but also across different classes within a single framework. For example,
Chan-Lau et al. (2012) have documented the impact of sovereign risk on banking sector
returns, while Mody and Sandri (2011) have examined the effect of financial sector stress
on sovereign spreads during the crisis. We leave these avenues for future research.
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Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
19/09/2008          Global Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson called for the U.S. government to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to take toxic 
mortgage assets off  the books of financial firms to restore financial stability in battered capital markets. 
29/09/2008          Global The U.S. House of Representatives voted against a compromise bailout plan that would have allowed the Treasury 
Department to buy up toxic assets from struggling banks. 
06/10/2008          Global Contagion from the U.S. credit crisis spread in Europe, gumming up interbank money markets as banks remained 
reluctant to lend to each other and investors fled to the safety of bonds. 
22/10/2008          Global Bond prices rise as stocks fall on recession and earning fears. 
31/10/2008          Global The interbank cost of borrowing dollars overnight continue to ease following the Federal Reserve's interest-rate cut earlier 
in the week, fueling hopes that global efforts to bolster confidence in credit markets are taking hold. 
08/12/2008          Global Stock markets around the world rebound, helped by several governments reinforcing their plans for countering the global 
economic crisis and by signs the U.S. was close to providing emergency finance for its automakers. Bond yields rose as a 
result and the U.S. dollar slipped as the need for a safe haven diminished. 
17/12/2008          Global The U.S. Federal Reserve enters uncharted policy territory as it chopped its benchmark interest rates to as low as zero 
and pledged to use "all available tools" to turn back a deepening recession. 
26/02/2009          Global Bond prices fell after consumer confidence rose unexpectedly for a sixth month. Bonds fell as stocks in Europe and Asia 
rallied sapping the demand for safety. 
19/03/2009          Global The U.S. Federal Reserve stunned markets by announcing it would pump another USD 1 trillion into the ailing U.S. 
economy by buying long term government debt for the first time since the 1960s and by expanding its purchases of 
mortgage bonds. 
01/04/2009          Local Fortis announces that the votes on the new agreement with BNP Paribas will be postponed under general meeting at the 
end of April. / OECD states that Spanish cajas remain a risky sector. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
07/05/2009          Euro ECB lowers its policy rate and announces refinancing operations with a twelve-month maturity. These operations will be 
conducted as fixed rate tender with full allotment. 
01/03/2010          Local Dexia wins EU clearance for restructuring. Dexia will suspend dividend payments and interest payments on instruments 
constituting own funds for three years. 
29/04/2010          Euro German Finance Ministry says that euro area countries are defending their currency and that failing to find a solution to 
Greek crisis risks a domino effect. 
10/05/2010          Euro Europe's Finance Ministers approved yesterday a rescue package worth EUR 750 billion aimed at ensuring financial 
stability across Europe by creating the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The Governing Council of the ECB has 
decided to conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities markets (by way of its Securities 
Markets Programme) to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments that are dysfunctional. 
10/11/2010          Local Ireland's central bank governor conceded that a huge bank recapitalisation programme had failed to reassure investors, as 
borrowing costs mounted along with concerns its new fiscal plan would not avert a bailout. 
12/11/2010          Euro EU leaders reiterated holders of outstanding bonds would not be forced to take losses in any debt restructuring. 
01/12/2010          Euro Bond purchases by the European Central Bank and growing expectations it could expand the scheme turned down the 
heat on the euro zone's higher-yielding sovereign debt. 
02/12/2010          Euro ECB is reported buying sovereign bonds in the euro area and extends unlimited liquidity policy. 
18/01/2011          Local A confidence motion called by Prime Minister Brian Cowen to shore up his leadership of the ruling Fianna Fail party 
weighed on Irish bonds. 
21/04/2011          Euro Germany's Free Democrats will defend parliament's right to veto German payments into a future euro zone bailout fund. 
03/05/2011          Euro Finland's eurosceptic True Finns party said it was sticking to its pre-election stance that it cannot support Portugal's bailout 
package. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
04/05/2011          Local Lisbon secured a 78 billion euro bailout. 
20/06/2011          Euro Finance ministers delay granting emergency loans to Greece. 
06/07/2011          Local Moody's downgraded the sovereign debt of Portugal to junk, stoking fears it would eventually have to restructure its debt. 
07/07/2011          Euro ECB raises its policy interest rates by 25 basis points. 
11/07/2011          Euro European finance officials struggled to find ways to resolve the debt crisis. 
12/07/2011          Euro Peripheral bonds rallied on Tuesday as talk of central bank buying of some lower-rated debt. 
13/07/2011          Euro The IMF joins Germany in pushing for private sector involvement. 
18/07/2011          Euro Investors feared a euro zone meeting on Thursday would make little progress towards a solution to the regional debt crisis. 
19/07/2011          Euro “The Reuters story that there will be a meeting on Wednesday of euro area finance ministers to narrow down the list of 
options is behind the tightening in peripherals," a trader said. 
20/07/2011          Euro Germany and France are reported to have reached an accord on a comprehensive solution to the crisis. 
21/07/2011          Euro Europe agrees sweeping new action on debt crisis. 
22/07/2011          Local Fitch pledged to give Greece a higher grade after its bonds had been exchanged. 
25/07/2011          Euro Moody’s is concerned that the 21 July package will undermine confidence in other countries because it expects a debt 
write-off could hit investments in Spain and Italy. “The support package sets a precedent for future restructurings should 
the finances of another euro area sovereign become as problematic as those of Greece,” Moody’s said. 
27/07/2011          Euro EFSF to get new powers before year-end. 
08/08/2011          Euro ECB says that it will actively implement bond-buying. 
09/08/2011          Euro ECB buys bonds in the market. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
10/08/2011          Local Dutch banks and insurers are willing to participate in refinancing aid for Greece, the chief treasurer of the Finance Ministry 
told parliament. 
30/08/2011          Local Eletrobras in Talks to Buy Portugal Government Stake in EDP. The sale of EDP is one of the measures the Portuguese 
government pledged to take in exchange for a 78 billion-euro bailout from the European Union and the International 
Monetary Fund earlier this year. 
05/09/2011          Global German yields hit a new record low as worries over the US economy and a series of challenges in Europe this week 
prompted investors to seek refuge in safe-haven debt. 
13/09/2011          Local Uncertainty over Greek debt swap take-up. 
15/09/2011          Euro Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner will discuss with European finance ministers the possibility of leveraging the euro 
zone's bailout fund to make it more effective in fighting the region's debt crisis. 
16/09/2011          Local French banks' participation in a Greek bond swap plan at the centre of a second Greek rescue package has reached over 
90 percent and backing is likely to rise, French Finance Minister Francois Baroin said. 
04/10/2011          Local Franco-Belgian financial group Dexia vowed on Tuesday to clean up its balance sheet. 
11/10/2011          Local Ireland says Anglo, Nationwide IOUs will cost EUR 47 bln. 
14/10/2011          Local Standard & Poor's cut the rating of French bank BNP Paribas as part of a downward revision of the country's banking 
sector. 
01/11/2011          Local Greek Prime Minister calls for shock referendum on the second bailout package for Greece. 
03/11/2011          Local Opposition leader Samaras rejects sharing power and calls for Prime Minister to quit. 
07/11/2011          Local Prime Minister Berlusconi faces increasing pressure to quit. 
09/11/2011          Local Prime Minister Berlusconi will resign after a humiliating parliamentary setback. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
10/11/2011          Local France snubs an EU call for more austerity, with ministers insisting that budget targets will be met. S&P issues an 
erroneous statement that France’s sovereign debt has been downgraded. / Italy’s Senate starts discussions on budget 
reforms. 
11/11/2011          Local Italy’s Senate passes key budget and economic reforms. 
14/11/2011          Local The Italian Treasury sold three billion euros of notes due in September 2016 at a yield of 5.29 percent, the highest since 
June 1997. 
15/11/2011          Euro Massive bout of uncertainty across several countries. 
18/11/2011          Euro European officials may start talks with the IMF on a mechanism for the ECB to lend to the IMF for sovereign bailouts in 
Europe. 
22/11/2011          Local Belgian yields soar on political deadlock. 
23/11/2011          Local S&P lowers subordinated debt ratings on Dexia because it sees possibility the EC could impose a debt restructuring 
detrimental to subordinated bondholders. 
24/11/2011          Local A French finance ministry source said an interim agreement to guarantee financing at troubled Franco-Belgian bank Dexia 
would be signed within days. 
25/11/2011          Local Fitch cuts Portugal rating to junk. 
28/11/2011          Local Belgium reaches a budget deal. 
30/11/2011          Euro Eurozone ministers agree to bailout fund leveraging rules. 
01/12/2011          Euro ECB Draghi says that ECB crisis response will be stronger if a deal on a new eurozone fiscal compact is reached. 
05/12/2011          Euro German Chancellor and French President agree to rewrite the EU governing treaties before the forthcoming EU Summit of 
9 December 2011. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
07/12/2011          Euro Top German official says he is pessimistic on EU Summit deal on a new fiscal compact. 
08/12/2011          Euro ECB plays down bond buying and rules out bolstering IMF resources. 
12/12/2011          Local Troika starts inspection in Greece to flesh out new bailout plan. 
13/12/2011          Local Talks on bond swap make progress and will continue. 
14/12/2011          Euro Germany rebuffs calls for further ECB action after EU Summit. 
15/12/2011          Local Spanish auction sells far more than expectations. 
16/12/2011          Local EFSF Regling says enough resources to cover up Spain. / Progress on Greek debt swap deal but success not guaranteed 
according to the IMF. 
06/01/2012          Local PM Papademos warns about Greek economic collapse without cuts. 
10/01/2012          Local Debt swap talks progress but no deal yet. Greek business household and corporate deposits continue their steady decline, 
the Greek central bank said. 
12/01/2012          Local Italian yields fall sharply after debt sale, helped by a substantial effect from ECB liquidity measures. 
13/01/2012          Local Belgian budget goal challenged as 2011 deficit misses target. 
16/01/2012          Local S&P downgrades the long-term rating of Portugal by two notches. 
26/01/2012          Euro The ECB is no closer to agreeing on whether or not it will take losses on its Greek bond holdings. 
27/01/2012          Local JP Morgan says that a restructuring of Portuguese debt is very unlikely in the near term. 
30/01/2012          Local Financial markets push Portugal towards bond pariah Greece. Business and consumer confidence slumps further. 
31/01/2012          Local Greece's private sector creditors could take a loss of more than 70 percent in a planned debt swap, Finance Minister 
Evangelos Venizelos said. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
01/02/2012          Euro / 
Local 
25 out of 27 EU states agreed to a German-inspired pact for stricter budget discipline, even as they struggled to rekindle 
growth from the ashes of austerity. / ECB may hold out on Greek swap until investor deal reached on debt burden. 
03/02/2012          Local Bank of Portugal says banking system is more resilient, robust. 
10/02/2012          Euro Juncker says that the ECB should contribute to the restructuring of Greek debt. 
13/02/2012          Local The ECB/EC/IMF troika has encouraging views on Portugal, Wolfgang Schäuble says. 
15/02/2012          Local Greek finance minster Venizelos accused European leaders of playing with fire by trying to oust the beleaguered country 
from the eurozone amid fears they want to delay releasing the EUR 130bn bailout until after Greek elections in April. 
29/02/2012          Local Portugal's program is on track, but challenges remain, IMF says. 
01/03/2012          Local "Greece has committed to a series of measures until the end of February. That is the condition for us to take the next step 
with the involvement of private creditors to bring about a reduction in total debt. And if it all goes to plan then we can agree 
a new programme for Greece, which would have the goal of enabling growth, bringing finances in order and reaching debt 
sustainability by 2020.”, Wolfgang Schäuble says. 
06/03/2012          Local Major Greek banks agree on bond swap deal. 
07/03/2012          Local Six Greek pension funds are still holding out against joining a sovereign bond swap deal while another eight have agreed 
to take part, a government official said on Wednesday, a day before the deadline for the offer expires. 
08/03/2012          Local Last day before Greek bonds are withdrawn from the market. Large uncertainty about final acceptance levels. 
09/03/2012          Local Greece averted the immediate threat of an uncontrolled default on Friday, winning strong acceptance from its private 
creditors for a bond swap deal which will eat into its mountainous public debt and clear the way for a new bailout. 
12/03/2012          Local Eurozone countries formally approved the 130 billion euro financial package that Athens needs to stay afloat, following the 
successful completion of the debt swap deal on Friday. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
14/03/2012          Local Greece's cabinet unanimously approved the terms of its international bailout on Wednesday. 
23/03/2012          Local Greece on Friday said it had extended to April 4 a deadline for private creditors to swap foreign-law Greek government 
bonds they hold for new securities as part of a debt restructuring. 
27/03/2012          Local Portuguese PM Coelho says markets are slowly recognizing efforts. Coehlo, speaking at the port of Simes in comments 
broadcast by SIC Noticias television station was referring to the drop in the yields of Portuguese two-year bonds today to 
below 10 percent. 
02/04/2012          Euro Eurozone manufacturing activity dropped to a three-month low in March, with the "malaise" spreading to top economies 
Germany and France. Eurozone unemployment hits record as debt crisis bites. 
07/05/2012          Local Greek conservative leader Antonis Samaras said on Monday he had failed to form a coalition government and had handed 
back the mandate to the country's president. 
08/05/2012          Euro Convertibility risk (exit from eurozone) is back on the frontpage in the aftermath of the Greek election. 
09/05/2012          Local Spanish banking group BFA and its troubled lender Bankia requested a partial nationalisation on Wednesday in a move to 
clean up its balance sheet and strengthen its solvency, hit by toxic real estate assets. 
14/05/2012          Local Greece moving inexorably toward new elections. Greek leftists Syriza reject proposal for technocrat government. 
15/05/2012          Local Greek political leaders meet on Wednesday to form a caretaker government that will lead the country into its second 
election in just over a month, with Greece's euro membership at stake in a mounting crisis rocking world markets. 
24/05/2012          Local Dexia SA starts exclusive talks with Sberbank about the sale of its Turkish bank unit Denizbank. 
31/05/2012          Local French consumer spending in April rose more than forecast. French bond  yield fall to record as investors look for return. 
11/06/2012          Euro Euro zone finance ministers agreed on Saturday to lend Spain up to 100 billion euros  to shore up its teetering banks and 
Madrid said it would specify precisely how much it needs once independent audits report in just over a week. 
Date BG NL BD FR IR ES GR IT PT Type News 
12/06/2012          Local Concern over how difficult it may be for Madrid to access debt markets in the long term after its banks are bailed out kept 
investors at bay. 
14/06/2012          Local Moody's cut the Spain's credit rating to just one notch above "junk", pushing borrowing costs ever higher and raising the 
prospect of a full-scale bailout. 
18/06/2012          Local Spanish bond yields hit a new euro-era high above 7 percent as initial relief after a pro-bailout vote in Greek elections gave 
way to pessimism about the problems surrounding the bigger Spanish economy. 
22/06/2012          Local Portugal's economy contracts at a slower rate in May, central bank says. 
29/06/2012          Euro Under pressure to prevent a catastrophic breakup of their single currency, euro zone leaders agreed on Friday to let their 
rescue fund inject aid directly into stricken banks from next year and intervene on bond markets to support troubled 
member states. 
05/07/2012          Euro Spanish and Italian bond yields spiked after ECB President Mario Draghi failed to deliver any hint that bolder monetary 
easing steps were on the way after the bank cut rates earlier in the day. 
 
